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Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon: The Erratic Takings
Jurisprudence of Justice Holmes
RicrtARO A. EPsTEIN*
INTRODUCTION

It has been said on more than one occasion that the single most important
pronouncement on the law of takings is contained in Justice Holmes's cryptic
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.' Exactly what Holmes stands for
in Mahon has been addressed in numerous articles, many of which are referred
to in Professor William Treanor's recent article on this subject, Jam for Justice
Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon.2 The revived search for Holmes's meaning, moreover, is for Treanor no disinterested quest of historical
scholarship. Rather, he is intent on showing that Mahon cannot serve as a
credible cornerstone for any revival of the Takings Clause, such as that evidenced, however imperfectly, in recent cases of the United States Supreme
Court. 3 In Treanor's view, "Mahon is uniformly held to stand for the proposi-

tion that the judiciary should closely scrutinize economic legislation for potential unconstitutionality.", 4 Taking issue with the conventional wisdom, Treanor
argues that in Mahon Holmes had rejected the various "categorical" rules that
could govem takings cases-that is, rules that looked to one single element
(e.g., physical invasion)-as a litmus test for whether compensation is required.
In place of that rigid conception, he claims, Holmes consciously adopted a
balancing approach featuring a fair measure of judicial deference to both federal
and state regulation. 5
From that observation, Treanor posits that two points follow. First, descriptively, the resurgence of judicial activism in takings cases cannot rely on
Holmes's short opinion in Mahon, which shows "both a high degree of deference to majoritarian decisionmaking and a rejection of the various formalist,6
categorical rules for a balancing test weighted in favor of the government."
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. I would
like to thank Michael Maimin of the Class of 1999 for his valuable research assistance.
1. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
2. William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86
GEO. L.J. 813 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding that city had failed to show
reasonable relationship between real estate exactions and proposed development); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (requiring compensation when regulation bars all
economically productive uses); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (requiring
Coastal Commission to pay compensation for easement); see also Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 117 S.Ct. 1659 (1997) (finding ripeness in takings claim), criticized in Treanor, supra note 2,
at 867-71.
4. Treanor, supra note 2, at 816.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Second, normatively, the new discordant notes in the takings debate should be
muffled, and the business of government regulation, be it of land use or public
utility rates, should continue as before, as a series of protracted political struggles,
judicially constrained only in extreme cases, when process itself is suspect.7
Some readers might think that my outspoken position in Takings8 should
oblige me to defend the conventional wisdom against Professor Treanor's attack
by reading Mahon as an antideferential decision on property rights. But I do not
conceive my task along such partisan lines. In this context, the fundamental
objective of academic inquiry is to develop a sound framework for determining
what forms of government regulation of private property are permissible under
the Constitution and why. Accordingly, Part I of this comment outlines my
approach to meeting this challenge. The subsequent task, taken up in Part II, is
to examine the extent to which Mahon, with its well-publicized disagreement
between Holmes and Brandeis, is consistent with the sound theoretical formulation of the issues. Theory comes first; case law interpretation and practical
politics only after the conceptual underbrush is cleared away.
I.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: COMPETITION, AGGRESSION,
AND MONOPOLY

Before defending my theory of the Takings Clause, it will be helpful to
clarify its general contours. The correct interpretation of the Takings Clause
begins with a proper respect for the primacy of private property and liberty of
action, but allows the government to respond by regulation to two major forms
of private misbehavior. The first of these, aggression, is the chief form of
behavior condemned by standard libertarian theorists. 9 To be sure, if aggression
were the only source of genuine social dangers, then constitutional law would
be far simpler than it presently is. But, of course, it is not. Private property does
not always lead to open competition. Unfortunately, monopoly power creates
social losses and thus requires separate treatment precisely because force and
fraud play no part in its creation and use. It too is a proper subject of
regulation. °
Aggression and monopoly are similar in that both drive a wedge between
individual and social welfare. In both cases, individuals prosper as a result of
behavior that injures society as a whole. This is not to say, however, that these
7. Id. at 816-17.
8. RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). I

discuss Mahon briefly there, treating it as an "easy case" on the merits, which it is, but not falling into
any of Treanor's categories of scholars on its larger impact. Id. at 63.
9. For the purposes of this comment, it is sufficient to lump together two vices, force and fraud,
under a single heading, aggression. In this context, it is unnecessary to spend much time determining
the scope of the antifraud provision of the police power, except to say that I do not think it should
receive an unduly narrow interpretation.
10. This list is not exhaustive. Laws that protect infants and incompetents from overreaching form a
third class, but not one relevant to the disputes, such as that over child labor laws. See, e.g., Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). For a discussion of Hammer, see infra note 58.
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two dangers are of equal magnitude, for the dangers of mass murder exceed
those of monopoly pricing and exclusion. But we cannot ignore monopoly
power simply because it is less potent than the unbridled use of force and fraud.
Both risks require some social response, and in neither case is the sensible range
of responses blocked by the Takings Clause.
This interpretive framework relies heavily on modem (but hardly novel)
insights of social welfare theory that were not fully formalized, or at least
widely disseminated, when Holmes and Brandeis voiced their disagreements in
Mahon. Nevertheless, both men, along with their contemporaries on the bench,
showed a strong intuitive appreciation of the basic framework articulated here.
Treanor, ironically, has lost sight of this basic structure, even as he recounts
with great vigor the key cases that marked its rise and fall. He is so anxious to
limit the role of the Takings Clause in future Supreme Court jurisprudence that
he fails to examine its interpretive foundations. But it is best to start by
explaining and defending this basic framework, before moving back to Mahon.
A. OPEN COMPETITION: THE BACKGROUND LIBERTY PRINCIPLE

Ordinary individuals do all sorts of things, both good and bad, with their
labor and their property. A sensible system of state regulation seeks to separate
the good from the bad, by doing its best to prohibit (or punish) the latter while
permitting (or facilitating) the former. The key task is to figure out which forms
of human behavior fall into which category, and why.
Start with the simplest of behavioral insights. Individuals normally-which is
not to say invariably-act to advance their self-interest, which includes benefits
to those close to them, chiefly family and friends. From that simple observation
stems the presumption that individuals should be allowed to do what they want.
Any actor will benefit from his or her behavior; in consequence we can find at
least one individual who is better off by virtue of the action undertaken. In all

cases we have then at least one reason to favor the liberty of action: the more
individuals who capture private gains, the better off we as a society shall be;
each person's gains carry through to the societal bottom line. That liberty of
action encompasses, moreover, not only the ability to use one's mind and body
as he sees fit, but also the right to use one's property as he sees fit. It is for that
reason that political theorists from Locke to the present have heralded life,
liberty, and property as the common objects that sound governments should
protect. The phrase runs through Locke, the Virginia Declaration of Rights, The

Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments."
11. John Locke's own phrase was "lives, liberties and estates." JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT 72 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1689). To track the influence of
Locke's phrase into the United States, see, for example, the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which
begins Article I with the phrase "That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent rights ... , namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." 1 THE FoUNDERS' CONSTrTUTION
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Yet it is critical to understand the guarded nature of this defense of liberty,
notwithstanding its historical pedigree. The respect for liberty of action is
presumptive and not absolute because the same self-interest that leads individuals to benefit themselves often induces them to take actions that are hostile to
the welfare of others. A complete defense of liberty has to reckon with the
consequences that individuals' actions have not only on the actors (and their
families and friends), but also on the full array of third parties1 2 who might be
harmed by their actions. How then should that harm be defined?
One of the most important cases of potential harm to others arises from
ordinary competition in the marketplace. Here it is easy to make the argument
that the disappointed competitor counts as someone who is harmed by the
activities of the successful one, and hence should be allowed to enjoin the
behavior that hurts. Huge systems of regulation have often been erected on this
dubious assumption: think only of the long history of airline rate regulation
under the Civil Aeronautics Board.1 3 But a moment's reflection should make it
evident that appeals to competitive harms cannot overcome the initial presumption in favor of liberty of action, including the right to possess, use, and dispose
of private property. The first argument that comes to mind is structural: if one
disappointed competitor can enjoin a second, then why cannot the second enjoin
the first? After all, the system of individual liberty speaks of equal or like
liberties for all persons, as in the familiar Lockean claim that all persons are
free, equal, and independent in the state of nature. 14 Competition by definition
always leaves disappointed competitors. Any effort to eliminate one disappointment requires that equal efforts be made to eliminate other similar disappointments, resulting in the inability of any competitor to prevail over any other. It is
as though no player could be cut from a professional sports team. The equality
contemplated in this regime is hardly one of equal liberty. It becomes transmuted into one of equal immobility that stifles not only competition, but
innovation and the gains from trade that mark ordinary commercial transactions.
Compared to this prospect of paralysis, the advantages of open competition
are vast. The combination of price and product that reaches the marketplace
under pure competition is better than that which reaches it under any rival order.
It is therefore quite natural that the traditional libertarian has a strong affection
for competitive markets and understands the idea of (actionable) harm nar6-7, 11-23 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). The opposition between property (as a
protected constitutional right) and safety (its police power limitation) is evident from the outset. For
similar language, see Article I of the Massachusetts Constitution: "All men are born free and equal, and
have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of
enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property;
in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." Id. at 11-23.
12. For a longer discussion of these points, see Richard A. Epstein, The Harm Principle-AndHow
it Grew, 45 TORONTO L.J. 369 (1995).
13. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The State of the Airline, Airport & Aviation Industries, 21 TRANsP.
L.J. 129, 133-42 (1992).
14. See, e.g., LocKE, supra note 11, at 8-9.
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rowly, so as to exclude competitive losses. The individual harm of the disappointed competitor is necessarily part of the social price paid for increasing the
freedom and opportunities of all persons in the long run. Lest one have concerns
about the disappointed competitor on distributional grounds, recall that markets
are in continuous operation, so that no single person assumes the role of
designated loser in all arenas of life. The system that operates to A's particular
disadvantage in one case allows him to enter the market in any one of a
thousand other niches, new and imagined, the next time around. The dynamic
properties of the system thus hold out powerful opportunities for all players,
especially relative to any collective alternative with restricted entry: there the
lack of the state's calling card could block entry into all markets.
The defense of open competition is not tantamount to a legal regime in which
anything goes. One sad truth about human behavior is that competition is not
the only form of human interaction between strangers, which is why we need
government in the first place. Yet the basic threats to the system are, first,
aggression, and second, monopoly. I will address them in order.
B. THE THREAT OF AGGRESSION: FORCE AND FRAUD

Suppose that A is a successful competitor and B a failed one whose goods do
not equal A's for reasons of price, quality, or both. B might seek to keep his
market position by taking and destroying A's goods. Alternatively, he might
intimidate A's customers, or lie to them about the relative attractiveness of their
goods. That conduct restores B to parity with A, but only at great cost to A and
any third parties who would deal with either. Together the losses to A and his
customers (and for that matter B's unhappy customers) far exceed the gains to
B. Furthermore, B, as an inefficient producer, makes less than A for the same
goods, and the customers all suffer losses that are uncompensated by any gains
elsewhere in the system. The same theory that praises competition condemns
these forms of competition as unfair and illegal.1 5 Generally speaking, therefore, any action whereby B uses force or fraud to limit the opportunities of his
competitors should be restrained by the state if the restraint can be implemented
at reasonable cost. To handle such cases, we have to articulate some conception
of the police power, understood to embrace at least those activities that the
police ordinarily undertake to preserve the order necessary for competitive
markets to survive. A state infrastructure, accordingly, is an important part of a
16
system of laissez faire, and is not in opposition to it.
The risks of aggression, however, are not confined to the use of force or fraud
between competitors. Sometimes a merchant will seek to sell spoiled or contaminated goods. Sometimes individuals will own animals afflicted by some conta-

15. For a classical exposition of the difference, see Mogul S.S. Co. v. MacGregor Gow & Co., 23
Q.B.D. 598 (1889) (Bowen, L.J.).
16. For one clear recognition of the point, see Jacob Viner, An Intellectual History of Laissez-Faire,
3 J.L. & ECON. 45, 45 (1960).
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gious disease that will spread to the animals owned by other individuals or, as
with the recent outbreak of mad cow disease, to human beings as well. These
cases of contamination, contagion, and public nuisance are matters that imperatively call for some form of government regulation, and huge portions of the
early literature on the police power are directed to cases that are designed "for
the protection of the community against the ravages of fire, the spreading of
pestilence, and the prevention of other serious calamities." 7
There is no great novelty here. The risk of harm to others is the very sort of
behavior condemned under tort and criminal law. The state power, when
invoked in advance, is only intended to substitute prevention for compensation
or punishment, as the case may be. That substitution is usually welcomed. No
private individual is likely to bring suit against potential malefactors: individual
plaintiffs receive only a fraction of the benefit but incur all the costs. The state
can tax its potential beneficiaries and then act on their behalf, overcoming their
endemic coordination problem. By acting promptly, it may entirely avoid the
loss, and thus avert any need to identify who is responsible for what harm and
whether that party is solvent. These actions do not benefit some abstract entity
called society; rather, they protect all individuals from external danger. The
question of compensation is utterly beside the point for actors whose conduct
falls within the domain of this prohibition: A should not have to pay his
neighbor not to infect his cows or his water supply any more than he should
have to pay her not to be killed. The legal system works on the assumption that
one pays for benefits conferred, not for harms withheld. Benefits conferred
include only services rendered or property delivered. The classical police power
simply follows and elaborates upon the traditional tort conception.
One key issue here is what happens when the state overshoots its mark and
directs its power against individual behavior that does not in fact pose the peril
for which the state action was designed. Holmes and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court faced just that issue in Miller v. Horton.18 The defendants
were members of the town board of health, who had ordered the destruction of
plaintiff's horse, which the board believed in good faith to be infected by
glanders. Subsequent examination revealed that this determination had been
made in error: the horse was indeed fit. The question was whether the officials
could be required to compensate the owner for the death of his horse. Its
resolution turned on the construction of the applicable statute, which Holmes
read with some difficulty to authorize compensation against the individual
official (but not the township)-thereby side-stepping any constitutional doubts
about the issue. 19 In dissent, Judge Devens thought the statute did not require
compensation, but that the refusal to compensate did not offend the constitu-

17. Miller v. Horton, 26 N.E. 100, 103 (Mass. 1891) (Devens, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 100.
19. See id. at 100-03.
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tional prohibition against taking property without just compensation. 20
In order to reach his decision, Holmes had to distinguish Train v. Boston
Disinfecting Co.,21 which examined a statute that required all imported rags be
disinfected before sale. The Train court had found that no compensation was
owed for the disinfecting, even for rags that had not been infected.2 2 Holmes's
response to that case was to evade its central challenge. He wrote: "Within
limits it [the legislature] may thus enlarge or diminish the number of things
deemed to be nuisances by the law, and courts cannot inquire why it includes
certain property, and whether the motive was to avoid an investigation." 2 3 But
so long as the conception of a nuisance imposes limitations on the scope of
constitutional power, this ploy has to fail, for surely the designation could not
apply to rags known to be free of infection, or to a scheme imposed when no
imported rags had ever been found to impose an infection risk. The better
explanation is that horses are inspected and rags are disinfected because one
does not know whether they are infected or not, and, given the perceived risk, it
is better to be safe than sorry. The prospective application of any statute carries
with it some measure of uncertainty, and, in the name of public health, that
uncertainty should be cast on the individual whose conduct poses the risk, not
on the society that might suffer the consequences of that risk.
This point contains an enormous concession to state power under conditions
of uncertainty. It also confirms the sad truth that any power granted to the state
can be abused, and the police power is no exception to the general rule. The
ostensible fire code is really a device to prevent new construction by potential
competitors. The tests for diseased animals and vegetables are designed to
protect local farmers from competition by superior goods imported from other
states or foreign nations. A maximum hour law is designed to prevent small
bakers from competing with larger establishments that use different work
rules. 24 A quarantine law is used to keep competitors from moving freely in
public areas.2 5 Nestle promotional candies with toys inside can be driven off the
market to protect the market for Mars Bars.26 This risk of abuse did not seem to
be of great weight in Miller v. Horton. But that happy fact does not justify a
"see-no-evil" approach across the board. Legislatures and administrative bodies
-will behave well when subject to some external control. They may stray from
their stated objective when that constitutional oversight is removed.
It is a close question how much scrutiny should be applied in these cases, and
my own view is that intermediate scrutiny (to use the modem phrase) suffices.
The presumption should be set in favor of police power regulation directed to a
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 103 (Devens, J., dissenting).
11 N.E. 929 (Mass. 1887).
Id. at 933-34, 937-38.
Miller, 26 N.E. at 102.
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (N.D. Cal. 1900).
See Katherine Pfleger, Bittersweet, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 27, 1997, at 12.
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proper end. Once set, it can be overcome by showing that the regulation is
selectively applied to individuals and groups within the same general risk class,
or that it is prompted by some invidious motive, such as hostility to Chinese
businessmen or Chilean grapes. The upshot is that one has to distinguish
suppression of disease and pestilence from suppression of competition, knowing
that in some cases the two elements might be intermingled. The motivation for
this approach should be clear, even if its mechanics are daunting: competition is
good, and disease is bad. A legal system that fails to distinguish between the
two has lost sight of its social function.
C. THE THREAT OF MONOPOLY

The second major exception to the presumption in favor of liberty of action
takes a different course. Often goods and services are not provided in competitive markets but by sellers who have a monopoly position. In some cases this
monopoly is achieved by private collusion, in which case an antitrust response,
by injunction or damages, requiring firms to compete with one another should
be sufficient to restore the desired competitive equilibrium. But sometimes the
state creates legal monopolies (as with customs offices), and sometimes natural
monopolies arise out of the necessary conditions for the delivery of certain
kinds of goods and services. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, and even
before, the question of how to regulate common carriers and public utilities was
very high on the social agenda. Because these firms could not be broken up into
efficient competitive units, legislators had to devise ways to prevent the holders
of these monopoly positions from exploiting their power, either by refusing to
serve different customers, by engaging in price discrimination keyed to the
demand of various groups, or by simply charging a uniform monopoly price.
At this point the story repeats itself. Rate regulation of public utilities offers
real possibilities for social gains, but carries with it real risks of abuse. Judicial
intervention into rate regulation has sought to find the middle path between two
extremes: the dangers of monopoly pricing on the one hand, and the risks of
disguised confiscation by state regulation on the other.27 Thus, the established
rates must be low enough to counter the risk of monopoly pricing, but high
enough to allow for a competitive rate of return on invested capital. The various
methods proposed to move between these two extremes are all subject to major
administrative difficulties, and could easily induce undesirable behavior from
the regulated industry, its customers, or both.
It is important to note that the risk of monopoly pricing justifies rate
regulation by the state only in limited settings; that is, when the danger of
monopoly pricing actually exists. Accordingly, this justification does not apply
to competitive industries-period. The firms in such industries already receive
27. For a modem statement, see Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307-16 (1989). For
an earlier discussion, see Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544-47 (1898) (developing the so-called "fair
value" test for rate or return regulation in the railroad industry).
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only a competitive rate of return. A system of rate regulation imposes additional
costs, and reduces the firm's revenue. The revised rate of return is necessarily
lower than the rate achieved in the competitive environment, and the dislocations that follow are likely to be legion: firms will withdraw capital from
underserved markets, new firms will refuse to enter the marketplace, queues and
black markets will form as administrative costs and political intrigue balloon.
So, once again, it becomes necessary to police the line between competition and
monopoly to keep rate regulation consistent with its only coherent social end.
Viewed comprehensively, the case for regulation places competitive markets
under siege from two directions: the power of the state to prevent aggressive
behavior that is anticompetitive or causes a public nuisance, and the power of
the state to prevent monopolies by setting rates. When does the regulation of
public nuisances and similar negative externalities become the disguised regulation of competitive practices? And when does the ostensible regulation of
monopoly become the suppression of competition? The proper goal of the legal
system in both cases is to minimize the regulation of competition and focus
state power against force, fraud, and monopoly. Ideally, one would like to have
a system that regulates only the evils and not the desirable conduct. But given
the uncertainties inherent in any system of state intervention, we must expect
imperfect results. Some anticompetitive activity will escape detection; some
principled competition will be squashed. The best we can do legally is to settle
on some social practice that for any given level of resources controls as much of
the private abuses, but restricts as little of private competition, as is possible.
Having said this, the forms of regulation used to respond to the monopoly
problem differ dramatically from those applicable to aggression and public
nuisance. Regulations of aggression deal with negative physical externalities for
which prohibition is the appropriate legal response, and for which compensation
is wholly inappropriate. Monopolies, by contrast, do not raise the specter of any
physical externalities, and thus the object of the rate cases was not to eliminate
compensation for the regulated industry, but to set it at the proper levels. This
point poses difficulties for Professor Treanor's argument, in light of his insistence on collapsing a useful distinction by endorsing "Holmes's merging in
Mahon of the two lines of cases ... by ...treating as relevant the post-World

War I rent control cases, such as Block v. Hirsh."' 28 In practice, regulations of
aggression and monopoly necessarily move in somewhat different directions,
albeit in pursuit of a uniform theme. Each is designed to protect competitive
institutions, but against different forms of subversion.
It is crucial, however, that regulation not become an end in itself. The entire
program of state regulation becomes utterly incoherent in the absence of its
proper end: unrestrained competition. Should regulators have any doubts about
the primacy of competition, the entire system will necessarily fall of its own
weight. There will be no prior established norm against which particular
28. Treanor, supra note 2, at 856.

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:875

institutional arrangements can be checked; the choice of institutional arrangements and objectives thus becomes a pure political play.
D. STATE REGULATION OF AGGRESSION AND MONOPOLY:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION

The entire matter of state regulation under the police power lay at the center
of debates over constitutional law when Mahon was decided, precisely because
the boundaries between competition on the one hand and aggression and
monopoly on the other were perceived to have major social importance. A few
cases illustrate this point, turning first to the tensions between competition and
aggression. Lochner v. New York 29 today receives ritual denunciations as a part
of the rite of passage into the higher realm of constitutional law. 30 But it is a

bum rap. Lochner considered whether a statute that imposed a ten-hour restriction on the hours of certain classes of bakers was inconsistent with the Federal
Constitution. The initial question to the Court was whether this statute imposed
a restriction on the liberty of contract protected under the Fourteenth Amendment-which, of course it did. This initial presumption of unconstitutionality,
once established, could be overridden by showing that the statute was justified
as an exercise of standard police power, namely, for the protection of health,

safety, and morals. Here, the Holmes dissent-as scandalous in its brevity as it
is elegant in its articulation--quickly concluded that the statute could be
justified as a measure taken to protect the public health.31
The real question posed by the statute at issue in Lochner, however, was
whether this statute should be classified as a labor law, designed to suppress competition and thus outside the proper scope of the police power, or

whether it was in fact a public nuisance statute, a legitimate exercise of the
police power designed to protect workers' health. The case was one of mixed
justification, but Justice Peckham, himself a New Yorker, saw through the ruse
and struck the statute down, as well he should have done. The objections to the
business arrangements were not advanced by any of Lochner's workers, but by
the state in the form of a statute that imposed criminal sanctions. Its basic
purpose was not to protect these workers, but rather to insulate the unionized
bakeries that employed workers in two ten-hour shifts against competition from

nonunion firms that deployed their workers in single twenty-hour shifts, and
thus were caught by the statute. The statute's neutral facade concealed its

29. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
30. See, e.g., Robert Brauneis, The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence: The
Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613
(1996). Brauneis takes the position that Mahon should be regarded as being cut from the same cloth as
Lochner, of which he heartily disapproves. Id. at 677-78. Brauneis's own substantive due process thesis
seems to me to be clearly wrong, except insofar as one might say that the Takings Clause is applied
against the states through the Due Process Clause. See Treanor, supra note 2, at 856 (arguing that
Mahon and Lochner are not alike, although Mahon is technically a substantive due process case).
31. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75.
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dubious motive and disparate impact. Why not strike it down for its anticompetitive effect?
The same danger of abuse arises under the monopoly prong of the takings
analysis. In Munn v. Illinois, the Supreme Court provoked a full debate of this
danger by introducing into American law the elusive concept of a business
"affected with (clothed by) the public interest." 32 At one level, the Munn
decision could be read to say that rate regulation is an appropriate response to
monopoly. There are clear intimations of the connection between monopoly and
rate regulation in the English materials cited by Justice Waite, most notably in
the famous passage from Lord Matthew Hale, De PortibusMaris [Concerning
the Gates to the Sea],3 3 and from Allnutt v. Inglis,3 4 which elevated Hale's
language into law. And at one other point, Justice Waite observes that the grain
elevators subject to rate regulation operated as a "virtual" monopoly that fell
within the narrow rule of the English precedents approving such regulation.35
But Munn can easily be read as giving a far greater scope to state regulation
of prices. Many parts of the opinion downplay the monopoly problem and take
the view that state regulation may be appropriate wholly without regard to
market structure.3 6 On this view, rate regulation could be justified entirely by
the size and importance of the industry, or of the firms within it, even though the
market structure is entirely competitive. Thus, Justice Waite defined "affected
with the public interest" by reference to a theory of implied dedication:
"Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to
make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.", 3 7 According
to this conception, an industry that is large and influential could be subject to
rate regulation, regardless of its internal structure, free of serious constitutional
restraint, and subject only to political pressures: "For protection against
abuses
' 38
by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts."
These two distinct conceptions of what threatens the public interestmonopoly, on the one hand, and the size or importance of the industry on the
other-are utterly irreconcilable as to theory and result. Let the concern be with
size and importance of the industry, and the number of alternatives available to
consumers no longer matters. But when monopoly is the focus of concern, the
size of the firm or industry is irrelevant so long as alternative sources of supply
are available. With this basic ambiguity enshrined doctrinally by Munn, the
32. 94 U.S. 113 (1876). For a history of the basic test, see Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with
Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930), whose ironic denunciation of the constitutional uses of the
doctrine defies easy summarization.
33. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 127 (citing Lord Matthew Hale, De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts 78,
for discussion of the requirement that monopoly "duties must be reasonable and moderate" in wharfing
context).
34. 12 East 527, 104 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1810), cited in Munn, 94 U.S. at 127-28.
35. Munn, 94 U.S. at 131-32.
36. Id. at 125-26, 131-33.
37. Id. at 126.
38. Id. at 134.
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courts had to weave their way through a definitional thicket in order to decide
whether insurance,3 9 ticket sales, 4 ° meat packing, 4' gasoline sales,42 and other
kindred activities were so affected with the public interest that Congress or,
more typically, the states could subject them to rate regulation. The more
limited account of the public interest-prevention of monopoly-was frequently denounced because the line between competition and monopoly did not
seem intelligible enough to be worth preserving.4 3 Meanwhile, in the years
between Munn and Mahon, the rival tradition that resisted any rate regulation in
competitive industries continued to exert a powerful influence.
To be sure, Holmes did not explicitly refer to Munn or any other "affected
with the public interest" cases in Mahon, although the phrase was invoked
during oral argument. 44 Doctrinally, however, Munn and Mahon are easily
distinguishable on two grounds. First, Mahon involved use restrictions, not rate
regulation. Second, industries were often held to be "affected with the public
interest" only when the public had some right to use their facilities, as with
transportation and communication. 45 But as Treanor has indicated, the monopoly cases could not be fully cordoned off from those involving property
"affected with the public interest." 46 Indeed, Holmes had broached that topic
just a year before when he upheld a group of rent control statutes (themselves a
form of price control) as a proper legislative response to the short-term tight
market brought on by World War I, which had allowed landlords to extract
unconscionable rents from their hapless tenants (or so a legislature might
find).47 Holmes's approval of these statutes provides yet another illustration of
how easily market power is confused with exogenous shocks to the market.
Holmes's position was not unlike that of the just price theorists, who believed

39. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 412-13 (1914) (holding that sale of fire
insurance is affected with public interest, over strong dissent of Justice Lamar).
40. Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 439-41 (1927) (reasoning that theater ticket pricing not
so affected).
41. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 543-44 (1923) (reasoning
that meat packing business not so affected).
42. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 240 (1929) (reasoning that sale of gasoline not so
affected).
43. Thus Hamilton wrote:
But the economic order is rapidly changing; as our knowledge of its structure and its
operation grows, our conceptions of how it works are subject to amendment or replacement.
A more intricate and better understood industrial world no longer is to be resolved by clearcut lines into the provinces of competition and monopoly; elements of the two are combined
in endless permutations in various businesses; in reference to any one of a dozen great
industries it would be difficult to say whether monopoly or competition is the more appropriate word.
Hamilton, supra note 32, at 1108-09.
44. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 407.
45. German Insurance, 233 U.S. at 406-07.
46. Treanor, supranote 2, at 852.
47. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156-57 (1921).
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that government intervention in the markets should be confined to those cases in
which natural disasters or other similar phenomena caused short-term dislocations in prices. But Holmes did not realize how quickly private markets would
respond to these pressures, and hence underestimated how durable rent control
would be once tenants (who vote) realized large gains from keeping a system of
price controls for the sole benefit of sitting tenants. The right response, therefore, was not to confuse short-term necessity with monopoly power. The
housing markets still had numerous sellers and free entry, and thus were very
different from cases of true private necessity, such as that involving a dock
owner who blocked out a ship owner during a storm, with potentially fatal
consequences. 4" The battle that Treanor recounts over the monopoly limitation
to "the affected with the public interest test" was of stupendous intellectual
importance. In my view, he attaches insufficient weight to that battle.
History, however, is not the only reason that the issues raised under this
model require constitutional treatment. Another is that the problems posed by
government regulation of private property require a structural, rather than a
substantive response. Generally speaking, constitutional law can respond to
future problems in two ways. First, it can establish institutional arrangements to
respond to future problems as they arise. That is why, for example, we have a
Congress and a President: to deal with crises at home and abroad. These sorts of
crises are so variable and unpredictable that they could not possibly be remedied by substantive rules, so the wise Constitution tries to get the right set of
decisionmakers in place in advance of the crisis of the day.
Second, recurrent problems may well admit substantive solutions. For example, we as a society believe strongly that no person should be a judge in his
own cause, and that political dissent is necessary. Our Constitution therefore
provides prohibitions against bias, and protections for freedom of speech. The
latter, moreover, are not makeshift affairs but face the same ticklish questions
implicated under the Takings Clause: is particular speech a call to debate or a
call to arms? We have to decide whether the First Amendment insulates the
press from the antitrust laws, 49 and whether lobbyists have a right to work on
behalf of cartels. 50 Yet we face these complexities because we know that the
substantive problems are permanent, and admit therefore of permanent solutions. We do not leave these issues for the legislature to sort out because we
know that its interests, or those of its many members, often deviate from what a
robust system requires.
The same is true with property and contract. We need the constitutional
structure to preserve some measure of competition, because we know that some
48. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
49. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (holding that First Amendment
does not preclude application of Sherman Act to news-gathering and disseminating organization).
50. See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)
(holding that use of third-party technique by railroads in campaign to influence governmental action did
not violate Sherman Act).
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group will always work to obtain special preferences for itself. The alternative
is to rely on the legislature to police the line between nuisance and competition,
or that between monopoly and competition, and to hit only the appropriate
targets for regulation. Holmes's muddle was that he did not have his feet
securely in either camp; he alternated between concerned constitutional structuralist and resigned political observer of popular democratic forces. On large
political issues of the day-the labor legislation at issue in Lochner, for
example-he thought that the majority had to have its way, or it would just
seize it. On smaller questions he was prepared to impose constitutional authority. But at every critical juncture, Holmes shrugged off hard choices with the
observation that "every hard question is a matter of degree," thus treating an
intellectual evasion as a judicial insight. The book on Holmes is therefore
destined to remain mixed: he is at once a friend and a foe of the new revival of
property rights. The sources of his ambivalence become evident, however, when
we look at his fateful decision in Mahon paragraph by paragraph; as we shall
see, his words cut both ways nearly at the same time.
II. MAHON REVISITED
A. THE UNDERLYING TRANSACTION

Good constitutional law often begins with a keen appreciation of the transaction that underlies any particular dispute. The first stage of Mahon's transaction
took place in 1878, when Pennsylvania Coal sold the surface rights to its land
subject to a reservation of its right to mine underground without having to
support the surface or the buildings or roads constructed on it. It appears that
these conveyances were made to a large number of private and public persons. 51
It follows that at the time of the initial conveyances, Pennsylvania Coal valued
its freedom from these obligations more than the surface owners valued the
support rights--otherwise, this covenant would not have been included in the
deal. 52 The arrangement here also made sense only because all surface owners
were bound; otherwise, support obligations to even a small number of surface
owners would so limit the company's freedom of action as to reduce the benefits
it received from the other, similar covenants already in place. The uniform
covenant thus eliminated the free-rider problem. No one forced any of the
surface owners to buy. The transaction looks like a voluntary exchange in
competitive circumstances-the kind that should be respected and enforced.
Forty-three years later, in 1921, Pennsylvania passed the Kohler Act. How
did the original set of support obligations fare in the interim? The business
51. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 406; see also id. at 412 (noting both the date of the covenants and that
Pennsylvania Coal started out as owner of the surface, a critical point, and not a small detail).
52. I set aside here the possibility that the buyers of the land might not have understood the bite of
the covenant. The issue was not raised below; there were no efforts to undo the transaction shortly after
it was consummated; and it is implausible to think that a large number of buyers were all lulled into the
same false sense of security.
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issues here should be evident: the value of rights obtained and surrendered
under long-term contracts fluctuate. The value of both coal and land might have
changed in the interim; the technology for removing coal might have improved
so that smaller support columns would be sufficient to support the surface 53 It
is easy to imagine a situation in which the original relationship between benefit
and loss might reverse itself for most landowners. Perhaps in 1921 the support
rights were worth more to the surface owners as a group than their negation
was to Pennsylvania Coal. That inference could easily be drawn if the support
rights had been conveyed to the surface owner for a price, leaving both sides
better off.
Of course, no such movement took place in the voluntary market. Yet we
cannot draw the converse inference from the parties' inaction: they may have
left the prior distribution of rights undisturbed because the freedom from
support obligations was still more valuable to Pennsylvania Coal than to the
surface owners. Or they might have done nothing because it was too difficult to
negotiate their voluntary reassignment. In principle we would like to able to
distinguish between these two cases, and use public force (if available at
reasonable cost) only when necessary to overcome the transactional barriers of a
voluntary market.
The reasons for state intervention here are vintage Coase.5 4 Even on the naive
assumption that Pennsylvania Coal could make a sensible trade with any one
surface owner in isolation, the firm does not operate in a competitive market,
but must renegotiate its way through a bilateral monopoly problem with that
one surface owner. The negotiations are costly and the price indeterminate.
Worse still, no isolated bilateral renegotiation was possible because the arrangement only made sense for Pennsylvania Coal if its covenants with the surface
owners were uniform. The sale of the single set of support rights could have
inhibited mining under the entire surface, and that in turn would have meant
that the loss to the coal company, system-wide, would in all likelihood have far
exceeded the gains to the one surface owner. So the coal company would have
had to deal with all of the surface owners at once; a negotiation that would have
raised a distinct coordination problem, in that all surface owners would have
had to agree on the size of the slices as well as the total size of the pie. A
breakdown in bargaining can take place in two dimensions, not just one. It is
thus not likely that there could have been any renegotiation, however desirable
such a step would have been.
So understood, Mahon was not a case in which one person sought to inflict a
nuisance on a stranger. The parties were in privity and had, by agreement,
allocated the relevant risks among themselves. The difficulties that arose were
akin to the bargaining issues that justify the regulation of common carriers and
public utilities. What was needed, therefore, was not a public intervention

53. WjIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLTICS 26-29 (1995).
54. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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analogous to injunction and prohibition, but some public analogue to rate of
return regulation. The coal company could have been forced to relinquish its
support rights (the so-called "third estate," one between the surface and the
mineral estates) at a competitive price. That purchase price, in turn, could have
been raised from the taxpayers (as substitutes to the ratepayers) by a special
assessment that measured the value of support rights to each plot of land located
over the coal deposits. By 1920, the body of special assessment law was well
developed for roads and other infrastructure improvements. 5 Application of
this body of law poses no conceptual problems here. Indeed, if the community
could not raise the taxes to protect these interests, then there would have been
good reason to think that the original allocation remained sound, and that the
new one was not. That could very well have been the case, given that the coal
companies habitually had taken steps to protect surface owners even though
they were not obligated to do so. 56 But for our purposes, the point is that
democratic institutions should have been used to determine whether the cost of
buying out the coal company's interest could be raised by taxing the persons
who stood to benefit from the transaction.
Once the full system of special assessments is put in place, both bargaining
problems can be resolved at once. The taxation system overcomes the problem
of holdouts among the surface owners; the condemnation procedures overcome
the threat that the coal company will hold out. If the system of special
assessments is well run (and its difficulties are not trivial), then the reassignment of the support estate should take place only when it is warranted. This
scheme does not ensure that the reassignment will take place whenever it is in
principle desirable, for its own transaction costs might be high enough to
preclude renegotiation. But so what? The most anyone can expect from balky
institutions is improvement, not perfection. The system of special assessments
could have generated a favorable result in at least some of the cases to which
that system could apply.
The basic intellectual structure of the Mahon case was, however, missed by
everybody at the time. If the correct analysis requires Mahon to be brought
under the monopoly wing of takings analysis, the great John W. Davis (who
represented the coal companies at the Supreme Court level) veered in the
opposite direction in oral argument. He promptly distinguished the Kohler Act
at issue in Mahon from the recent rent control acts previously sustained by the
Court,57 on the grounds that they represented a response to the short-term run
up in rents brought on by the war emergency. Davis did not distinguish between
necessities that operate on competitive markets and those that operate in
monopoly conditions. Nor did he appeal to the rate of return or special assess55. See generally Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Special
Assessments in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1983).
56. FiscHEL, supra note 53, at 37-47.
57. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922); Mahon, 260 U.S. at 406-07, 409 (citing Block
v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921).

1998]

THE ERRATIC TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE HOLMES

891

ment cases to make his case for compensation. He only sought to show why the
police power cases that dealt with such issues as the child labor acts (which he
58
had defended without success, as Solicitor General, in Hammer v. Dagenhart,
some four years before) were sound applications. The point that Davis missed
was also overlooked by Holmes, who on this point followed Davis's lead.59
Neither man saw how the monopoly argument could allow for the forced
transfer from the coal companies without wiping out their claims for compensation.
B. THE LAW

Holmes's conceptual confusion has come to haunt the law. His short opinion
lurches unhappily between brilliant insight and utter nonsense-precisely because his instincts are not disciplined by any overriding theoretical approach. It
is no wonder, therefore, that Treanor splits off from other commentators on the
question whether Holmes fits into the deference camp on takings issues. 60 The
sad truth is that the worthy Justice could not make up his own mind, even as he
touched many of the issues that have remained staples in the law of takings to
this day. The twists and turns in Holmes's exposition are best displayed sequentially. I shall therefore analyze the core of his opinion paragraph by paragraph.
Holmes starts on a grand note of high theory:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must
have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for
consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When
it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the
question depends upon the particular facts. The greatest weight is given to the
to
judgment of the legislature, but it always is open to interested parties
61
contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional power.

Holmes's initial point is surely correct, but he offers only one piece of the
overall explanation. He is right that the administrative costs of compensation
would be so prohibitive that all reform of the general laws, good and bad, would

58. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). At issue in Hammer was a federal child labor act more stringent than the
various state acts. Davis defended the federal action on the ground that it was necessary to overcome a
coordination problem between the states: "Thus, if one State desired to limit the employment of
children, it was met with the objection that its manufacturers could not compete with manufacturers of
a neighboring State which imposed no such limitation." Id. at 254. He did not see the connection
between the two situations. For the reference to child labor in Mahon, see Mahon, 260 U.S. at 396.
59. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
60. See, e.g., Treanor, supra note 2, at 816-17, 829-31, 844-49, 855-56.
61. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
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be blocked. But he fails to note that the principle of average reciprocity of
advantage, to which he refers later, applies well only to general laws. 62 When
such laws are expressed and debated in abstract and general terms, they are
likely to be changed only when the average advantage favors the change. In the
limiting case, in which everyone is in an identical position under the general
law, no one has any private incentive to deviate from the ideal social solution.
For example, if the new regime is worth $10 to each, and the old one only $8, it
does not matter how many individuals are in the pool: all will support the
change from which they can gain $2, and none will be able to leave that
coalition because special rules (which always yield differential benefits) are
systematically kept off the table. It is not possible to single out special persons
for adverse treatment in the reform of such general laws as the statutes of
limitation and the parol evidence rule.
The Kohler Act is quite different. We could characterize it as a general law
because it applies to all land over anthracite coal. Or we could call it particular
because it applies only to land over anthracite coal. But the issue of whether the
Act is general or particular is only a loose and imperfect proxy for the real
question, which is whether the statute works a redistribution of assets between
various groups of individuals. Here, so long as coal companies are lined up on
one side of the statute and surface owners on the other, the statute takes from A
and gives to B.
This change in general law has profound distributive consequences. It is not
necessary to single out one individual in order to effectuate this forbidden kind
of transfer. When all A's are the same, and all B's are the same, the astute
legislature can redistribute assets on a mass scale. We know that surface owners
have more votes in local elections than coal companies, even though the coal
companies may have more financial clout. In the abstract, it is hard to predict
whether dollars or votes would win. But in the case of the Kohler Act, the derby
has already been. run, and we know that the coal companies came in second
place.
Because Holmes has no general theory of the Takings Clause, he takes his
first wrong turn in trying to explain why general rules don't really call into
question the takings problem.63 His intellectual blunder is to make the law turn
on the extent of the diminution in value-whether the regulation goes "too far."
He thus focuses on the size of the loss in one individual case, and ignores any
question of system-wide efficiency-for which substantial diminutions in value
operate, at best, only as a one-sided social proxy. To be sure, in those cases in
which one person does suffer that diminution in value, something is clearly
amiss: someone is harmed without compensation. Presumptively, the proper
procedure in such cases is to allow the program to go forward only if its winners
compensate that loser for his big-time losses.
62. Id. at 415.
63. Id. at 414.
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But Holmes's test is woefully incomplete. Even when the loss is borne
entirely by a single person or entity, it is wholly unclear whether Holmes
measures the size of the loss in absolute or relative terms. As an illustration of
this point, compare two cases. In the first, Amy starts with land worth $10 and is
left with nothing. In the second, she starts with $100 and is left with $80.
Clearly, she would prefer to suffer the first loss of $10, rather than suffer the
second loss of $20. But the "too far" test is wholly silent on whether the
relevant test is dollar or percentage loss. Today it looks as though it is the
percentage loss that counts, which is one reason that Holmes went along with
the majority of the Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty.64 Yet the perverse
incentives that such a test creates are manifest: it encourages government to
enact extensive systems of regulation that do not quite reach the percentage
limit established by the Court, but that cause massive dislocations of assets
nonetheless.
Holmes's test also fails because it does not accurately track diffuse social
gains and losses. Many programs generate substantial social losses, even though
they do not heap substantial losses on one actor. Suppose that a society in the
initial position has 100 people, each with a net worth of $10. A new program
comes along that increases the wealth of fifty percent of the population by one
each, from $10 to $11, but reduces the wealth of the remaining fifty percent by
two units, from $10 to $8. The overall effect is the loss of $50 overall (from
$1000 to $950), but the broad distribution of the losses keeps the case outside
the orbit of the Takings Clause as Holmes construes it. Yet if the new legal
regime brought about the bankruptcy of ten individuals, with a gain of $1 to
each of fifty individuals, leaving forty individuals unaffected, then the ten
would have to be compensated.
In tabular form, the two cases look as follows:
Scenario I
Initial Distribution
100 @ $10 = $1000
Scenario II
Initial Distribution
100 @ $10 = $1000

Final Distribution
(50 @ $11) + (50 @ $8)
= $950

Outcome
No compensation

Final Distribution
(50 @ $11) + (40 @ $10)
+ (10 @ $0) = $950

Outcome
$100 Compensation

Holmes offers no clue why these two scenarios should lead to different
payment outcomes, when the overall social losses are identical in both cases.
64. 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% decline in value, from $800,000 to $200,000). Yet a wipeout of a $50,000
parcel gets more legal protection. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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One possible explanation is that the fifty losers in the first scenario have better
chances to defend themselves in the political arena, and therefore are less likely
to suffer even small losses. But whatever their chances of success ex ante, the
outcome reveals that they have lost ex post, and that their private losses
correlate with net social losses. So why not require that these persons be
compensated before allowing the program to go forward? (And if compensation
is required, the program will not go forward, which is, in fact, the desirable
result.)
In response, it could be said that the small size of the individual losses in the
first scenario means that the losses in overall social wealth are smaller than the
individual losses in wealth, so that there is little reason to be concerned. But by
the same token, this first scenario offers only small gains in wealth to the
winners. And in the second scenario, unless someone knows the distribution of
overall wealth for the winners and losers, it is not clear how the gains and losses
caused by a single program square with any overall distributional objective. The
short answer is that Holmes's first cut at the problem-his embrace of the
diminution of value test-allows legislative programs that generate very substantial social losses to fly safely under the radar. His opinion may have struck down
the Kohler Act, but by equating "too far" with "total wipeout," it has provided
the theoretical justification for countless generations of misguided government
programs. This first misstep is the most decisive to the overall flow of cases.
Holmes makes this error because he labors under the optimistic belief that
rules of general application necessarily result in benign consequences. He is
skeptical, moreover, of the proposition that programs with skewed distributions
generate social losses. The move from this substantive skepticism toward some
form of deference is virtually foreordained: after all, if a judge has no principled
reason to condemn a program, then why not leave matters to legislative
discretion? It takes judicial energy and moral conviction to intervene, and
Holmes has neither. All in all, Holmes has touched grand themes at this initial
stage in his analysis, but conceptually (as opposed to stylistically) he is off to a
poor start.
His confusion is compounded in the next paragraph:
This is the case of a single private house. No doubt there is a public interest
even in this, as there is in every purchase and sale and in all that happens
within the commonwealth. Some existing rights may be modified even in such
a case. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368 [(1889)]. But usually in ordinary
private affairs the public interest does not warrant much of this kind of
interference. A source of damage to such a house is not a public nuisance even
if similar damage is inflicted on others in different places. The damage is not
common or public. Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co., 13 Allen, 95, 103 [(1866)].
The extent of the public interest is shown by the statute to be limited, since
the statute ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the
owner of the coal. Furthermore, it is not justified as a protection of personal
safety. That could be provided for by notice. Indeed the very foundation of
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this bill is that the defendant gave timely notice of its intent to mine under the
house. On the other hand the extent of the taking is great. It purports to
abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land-a very
valuable estate-and what is declared by the Court below to be a contract
hitherto binding the plaintiffs. If we were called upon to deal with the
plaintiffs' position alone, we should think it clear that the statute does not
disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant65so extensive a destruction of the
defendant's constitutionally protected rights.
Holmes's initial sentence is designed to stress the opposition between the
general laws he discussed in the previous paragraph, and the quite specific
application of the law at issue in this case. In order to make this distinction,
Holmes has to establish a conceptual severance between public and private
losses. But he is most uneasy about the separation, and therefore backtracks in
his second sentence by stating that there is a public interest "in every purchase
and sale." Then, unhappy about his concession, Holmes alters his definition of
public interest by claiming that the damage here does not constitute a "public
nuisance," even if identical losses befall other houses. On this point at least,
Holmes is technically correct in that the activities of the coal company do not
obstruct or otherwise interfere with the use of public lands or waters, which
remain open for the use of all. But the sense in which Holmes is correct depends
upon his assumption that the word "public" refers only to facilities from which
no person can be excluded, as in the usual economic accounts of public goods.
In making this assumption, Holmes downplays that yawning possibility, which
treats as "public" any set of actions, however distributed, that affect large
numbers of individuals, as the Kohler Act surely does. The problem is not
simply that one house might stand or fall. It is that large portions of the
community will be affected in parallel ways by the creation or elimination of
the support estate for surface lands. Holmes's narrow approach blinks at that
reality, and ignores the coordination problems that arise when some collective
response is needed to a set of parallel losses.
This is not to say that the homeowners'. interests are the only ones at stake.
On the contrary, we must be aware of how the new regulation affects all
interested parties. The correct approach still asks whether, on net, the shift from
the older system which removed support rights is better or worse for these
landowners as a group than the newer system ushered in by the Kohler Act. This
question drives the analysis back to system-wide comparisons that take into
account not only the position of the surface owners, but of the coal companies
as well.
At this point, Holmes again shifts ground and states that the statute does not
have the public interest at heart because it does not apply to cases in which the
coal company owns both the surface and mineral rights. But such cases of

65. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-14.

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:875

unified ownership hardly cut one way or the other. As Brandeis noted in dissent,
the individual who owns both sets of rights will have a clear incentive to take
into account the loss to (his own) surface interest when he mines coal 66-- after
all, he bears both the gains and the losses that result from his activities, and if he
cannot figure out which is worth more to him, what hope is there that any
regulator could do the job? The bottom line is that removing these cases of
unified ownership from the Kohler Act's application improves the fit between
the law and the problem it was designed to address, by concentrating its fire on
those cases in which a mining company's activities cause harm to others, which
is where the coordination problems do arise.
Holmes's next sentence evinces yet another shift in attitude. He has described
the case as one with substantial private diminution in loss, and next turns to the
public side of the equation: is that loss justified by an appeal to public safety? It
is evident from this, as Treanor observes, that Holmes has followed some kind
of balancing approach. But the critical issue is not whether Holmes applied a
balancing test: balancing is always required in every legal context. The common
law judges who allow private parties to abate a nuisance by self-help have
engaged in a form of balancing. State and federal judges who address the ability
of the state to abate a nuisance necessarily make the same sorts of balancing
calculations. In both cases, the key question is not whether balancing takes
place, but how it takes place.
On that score, Holmes turns less deferential than he was just a paragraph
earlier. He takes the sensible position that safety to an individual homeowner
can be secured by requiring the coal company to give him notice of its intention
to mine. Armed with notice, the surface owner has an opportunity to mitigate
damages by moving off the premises, by shoring up his land, or by seeking to
avoid or reduce his losses in some other way. That solution is in fact common in
the case of lateral support, which requires a landowner to give notice of his
intention to dig so that the neighbor can shore up his own buildings in
advance. 67 Unfortunately, Holmes does not address the question of whether
more stringent measures could afford still better protection for surface owners.
After all, mitigation only reduces losses; the Kohler Act tries to stop them
altogether. Holmes is quite unwilling to confront the question of which outcome
is better, and exposes himself to an effective Brandeis counterattack on precisely these grounds.6 8
It is here that Holmes's lack of theory takes its toll. The right way to analyze
this question is to defer initially to the state's judgment on the issue of whether
the additional precautions are worth their cost. In making this judgment, the
state must take account of the fact that, so long as the notice system is in place,

66. Id. at 420 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
67. See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its UtilitarianConstraints, 8 J.
LEGAL STuD. 49, 94-96 (1979).
68. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 420 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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the losses from the current regime are effectively reduced. The purchase of the
support estate is therefore worth less to the surface owners than it would be if
the coal companies could commence mining without providing notice. The state
should factor that reduced gain into the equation before deciding whether to use
special assessments to buy support rights. The use of the compensation method
therefore relieves the court of having to decide how much deference is owed to
public officials in any particular case. The legislature can make the judgment for
itself, so long as it pays for what it takes.
Holmes next turns to the facial challenge to the statute:
It is our opinion that the act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police
power, so far as it affects the mining of coal under streets or cities in places
where the right to mine such coal has been reserved. As said in a Pennsylvania case, "For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right to mine
it." Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal Co., 256 Pa. St. 328, 331 [(1917)].
What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with
profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very
nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroy69
ing it. This we think that we are warranted in assuming that the statute does.
Holmes thus returns to the private interest that is sacrificed by the Kohler Act.
But he misidentifies the state's objection to the Coal Company's activities.
Holmes claims that the Act effectively prohibits the Coal Company from mining
its coal. In so doing, he ignores the very powerful contention of W.L. Pace,
attorney for the state, that the Kohler Act "contains no provision requiring any
mine owner to leave coal in place. If natural support other than coal be
available, or if artificial support be provided, every pound of coal can be
removed from the mines.", 70 John W. Davis, his opponent, had weakly anticipated the argument when he stated: "The theoretical right to remove the coal
without disturbing the surface is, as a practical matter, no more available than
was Shylock's right to his pound of flesh."' 71 The technical point here is that the
statute does not identify which coal must be left in place in order to satisfy the
statutory obligation. Holmes extracts from this regime the conclusion that
whatever coal is left in place is taken by the state because it can no longer be
removed with profit. His focus is on the pillar of coal that is left in place: that is
the bit of property that is lost, and it is the state's requirement that this coal not
be mined that goes "too far."
But in so doing, Holmes sidesteps the rejoinder that although the coal may
not be mined by the company, it does not pass into the possession of the surface
owner either. The surface owner exerts a defensive position, a kind of lien over
the coal, so that it cannot be mined; but under no construction of the Act could
69. Id. at 414-15.
70. Id. at 410.
71. Id. at 395
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the surface owner mine and sell that coal himself. At most some, but not all, of
the rights in the coal are transferred. The point here is of no little concern,
because the shift in rights makes it very difficult to decide (assuming we care)
whether the statute works a physical taking of the coal or is a mere regulation
that restricts its use. The truth of the matter is that neither characterization
works well, given that the focus of the statute is on the support, not the pillar of
coal used to maintain it. More generally, the case demonstrates the unprincipled
nature of the modem distinction between physical and regulatory takings, terms
that were introduced into the Supreme Court's lexicon only as late as 1981.72
Yet once Holmes has nimbly skirted this statutory difficulty, he errs again.
Because he is content to strike down the Act on its face, he never asks what
compensation would have been required in order for the statute to pass constitutional muster. Given Holmes's focus, it appears as though the coal miner should
receive compensation only for the particular bits of coal that can no longer be
mined. But that is the incorrect measure. Brandeis gets the better of this
argument by insisting that, because the Act did not specify any particular pillar
of coal, the correct measure of damages was the difference in the value of the
subject mine before and after the restriction is imposed.7 3 That figure could be
less than the fair market value of the coal if some coal had to be kept in place to
protect the mine, its equipment, and its workers. Nothing in the record supports
the assumption that all of the coal could be removed if the Act were repealed.
Alternatively, the protection of surface owners could so drastically impede the
operation of the mine that its value decreases by more than the value of the coal
that has to be left in place to satisfy the statute. In sum, it is impossible to say
definitively how much compensation is appropriate. But surely the test for
compensation in this case should be the same as that followed whenever a
covenant or easement is placed on land under the takings power: the coal
company is compensated for the incremental losses to the entire operation, and
not for the value of the (unidentified) pillar of coal.
This point sheds light on the great controversy over the role of numerators
(the property taken) and denominators (the property from which it was taken) in
takings law. Holmes's view of the subject seems to be that the inability to mine
the coal in the support pillars was a total loss of that limited amount of property:

72. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent, in which Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell concurred,
ironically criticizes a holding by the California Court of Appeals that "fail[ed] to recognize the
essential similarity of regulatory 'takings' and other 'takings.' "Id.
73. In Brandeis's own words,
[Vialues are relative. If we are to consider the value of the coal kept in place by the
restriction, we should compare it with the value of all other parts of the land. That is, with the
value not of the coal alone, but with the value of the whole property. The rights of an owner
as against the public are not increased by dividing the interests in his property into surface
and subsoil. The sum of the rights in the parts cannot be greater than the rights in the whole.
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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the ratio of numerator to denominator is thus one to one. He might well have
refused to offer compensation for the reduction in value of the mine attributable
to the new restriction on its operation, for that would have been only a small
fraction of the total value of the mine. Here, a small numerator over a large
denominator might not go far enough in compensating the property owner, as
Brandeis observed.7 4 Brandeis claimed that the landowner could not increase
his right to gain compensation by dividing the coal from the surface. 75 But his
argument works equally well in reverse: the landowner should not be forced to
sacrifice his right to compensation by any division of ownership that takes place
either. In all cases, the law should limit the opportunities for strategic behavior
by providing that in any private transaction, rights of compensation are presumed in both directions, not just one, as Brandeis posits.
At this point, the true tragedy of Mahon is revealed. Holmes and Brandeis
both settle on the "too far" test as the ultimate standard, and then divide on the
question of what "part" has been taken of what "thing." ' 7 6 But neither confronts the point that any conceptualization of numerators and denominators
bears absolutely no relationshipto what is gained or lost by property owners as
a result of the statute. Why should $1000 in coal be compensated in full if
$10,000 in market value of a $1,000,000 mine is left utterly uncompensated?
The amount of compensation should always depend on what is taken from the
owner. The more that is taken, the more that should be paid. The bill the courts
hand to the state should depend only on the loss sustained, not on the ratio of
the size of what is taken to the size of what is retained.
Holmes's confusion is our legacy. Professor Margaret Radin's familiar attack
on the strong system of property rights rests in large part on the claim that
Holmes relied on the dubious strategy of "conceptual severance," which "consists of delineating a property interest consisting of just what the govermment
action has removed from the owner, and then asserting that this particular whole
thing has been permanently taken.", 77 The well-known turnaround from Mahon
to Keystone Bituminous CoalAss'n v. DeBenedictis78 relies on Justice Stevens's
repudiation of that view of takings. But the whole exercise is a massive
diversion. The only test for takings that matters is one that looks at the rights
that were lost, and not their relationship, be it large or small, to the property that
was retained. 79 That test does not vary with the description of the underlying
bundle of rights, and has the great virtue of linking the constitutional measures
of damages to the actual economic losses triggered by the loss of individual

74. See id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
76. Compare Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416 (Holmes, J.), with id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
77. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence
of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1676 (1988).
78. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
79. For my earlier defense of this position, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 16-19.
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rights. The broader view of constitutional protection of property rights does not
depend on any formalist vision of the subject. It depends on using the same
standards for compensation in public disputes as in private ones. Professor
Treanor is therefore wrong to chide Justice Scalia for his insistence that the
Takings Clause be read to compensate each discrete interest as though it stood
on its own base.80 The right criticism of Scalia is that he thought that takings
analysis should turn on the size of the property interest taken in the first place,
rather than the value of the rights that the property owner has lost. Unfortunately, the friends and foes of property rights both follow Holmes over a
conceptual cliff. It appears that his initial false move in Mahon has condemned
takings law to eternal incoherence.
Holmes does a bit better in his next paragraph:
It is true that in Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 [(1914)], it
was held competent for the legislature to require a pillar of coal to be left
along the line of adjoining property, that, with the pillar on the other side of
the line, would be a barrier sufficient for the safety of the employees of either
mine in case the other should be abandoned and allowed to fill with water. But
that was a requirement for the safety of employees invited into the mine, and
secured an average reciprocity
of advantage that has been recognized as a
81
justification of various laws.
In this section, Holmes shifts the inquiry from what has been lost to what has
been gained in exchange. His point here is quite simply that in-kind compensation will meet the requirements of the Takings Clause. This pattern of reciprocal
protection will achieve that result when the two mines are side by side. But we
have no reciprocity at all between the surface owners and mine owners. The
entire transfer (even after it is properly measured) goes in one direction. So we
return to redistribution from mine owners to surface owners. In this case, a
taking that is not justified under the police power is not saved by the presence of
implicit in-kind compensation.
Professor Treanor insists that there is really little difference between Holmes
and Brandeis because both are deferential to state operations. But judicial
deference varies issue by issue, and on this point at least the difference between.
the two justices is palpable. Justice Brandeis concluded his opinion by stating
that there is "no room" for dealing with the average reciprocity of advantage
when the police power is at stake.82 He therefore gave great deference to state
justifications with skewed distributional consequences. For those who think that
implicit in-kind compensation is an essential portion of the overall constitutional scheme, this difference looms very large in the grand order of things.
80. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 503 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992), criticized in
Treanor, supra note 2, at 15-16.
81. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
82. Id. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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And, for the moment at least, Holmes is on the side of the angels.
But then Holmes veers off in another direction: he questions the support
rights for public roads and highways that are also protected by the Kohler Act.
Here, we certainly have the risk of a public nuisance to which Holmes referred
earlier in his opinion. 83 But Holmes rightly turns this issue against the constitutionality of the Kohler Act. He writes:
The rights of the public in a street purchased or laid out by eminent domain
are those that it has paid for. If in any case its representatives have been so
short sighted as to acquire only surface rights without the right of support, we
see no more authority for supplying the latter without compensation than
there was for taking the right of way in the first place and refusing to pay for
it because the public wanted it very much. The protection of private property
in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but
provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation. A
similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 605 [(1908)]. When
this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police
power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification
more and more until at last private property disappears. But that cannot be
84
accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United States.
The power evident in this passage comes from Holmes's intuitive appreciation of the dangers of strategic behavior. The state acquires surface rights only
at time I, and pays a lower price for what it gets. Then it pleads its necessity as a
reason at time II to take over the support rights by legislative decree. With a
short delay in time, it gets the entire package for the price of only one of its
parts. This short cut cannot be permitted, for otherwise the government has a
massive incentive to engage in opportunistic conduct. The correct approach
allows the state to time its purchase as it sees fit: it can lump its acquisitions at
one time, or stagger them if it so chooses. But choice carries with it a
responsibility: here, to pay the property owner full compensation, measured by
the value of what is acquired when it is acquired. The Takings Clause power
allows forced purchases for public use. But the police power cannot be invoked
to defeat the compensation requirement when the necessity that justifies it is
created by the state itself.
Holmes then offers his great summation.
The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. It may be
doubted how far exceptional cases, like the blowing up of a house to stop a
conflagration, go-and if they go beyond the general rule, whether they do

83. See id. at 413-14; see also text following supra note 65.
84. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:875

not stand as much upon tradition as upon principle. Bowditch v. Boston, 101
U.S. 16 [(1879)]. In general it is not plain that a man's misfortunes or
necessities will justify his shifting the damages to his neighbor's shoulders.
Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 172 Mass. 488, 489 [(1899)]. We are in
danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change. As we already have said, this is a
question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. But we regard this as going beyond any of the cases decided by this
Court. The late decisions upon laws dealing with the congestion of Washington and New York, caused by the war, dealt with laws intended to meet a
temporary emergency and providing for compensation determined to be
reasonable by an impartial board. They went to the verge of the law but fell
far short of the present act. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 [(1921)]. Marcus
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 [(1921)]. Levy Leasing Co. v.
Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 [(1922)]. 85
All the themes come together in this passage, but they do not cohere. Holmes
reaffirms his initial, misguided threshold requirement that the regulation must
not go "too far"-language that has been the salvation of the strong statists. He
next addresses the takings issue in public necessity cases and shows the same

commendable uneasiness about denying compensation as he did in his days on
the Massachusetts bench. More generally, he stoutly reaffirms his view that the
necessity can justify the intervention, but cannot excuse the state's obligation to
compensate those whose property it takes. Holmes then returns to his basic
theme, that the state which wants to make changes (as with support rights under
public roads) has to pay for them-a sentence repeatedly quoted by the defenders of private property, only partly out of context. And then he states his deep

conviction that these cases are a matter of degree. He is surely right that this is
true of some of the questions that arise in takings cases: for example, how
disparate an impact is needed to trigger the compensation requirement. But he
overstates the point terribly given that there are some takings issues that are not
a matter of degree, and that do admit of a principled answer: for example, that
takings are takings whether or not they go "too far." Finally in this passage, he
distinguishes the rent control statutes from the Kohler Act on the basis that the
former were emergency measures, without recognizing the capacity of such
measures to endure far beyond the emergency that calls them into existence.
The one large piece of the puzzle that remains is the role of consent in takings
cases. Here Holmes takes a view that is quite similar to the tort-law concept of
"assumption of the risk," which again sets him apart from Brandeis. He thus
closes his opinion with this tartly worded paragraph:
We assume, of course, that the statute was passed upon the conviction that an
85. Id. at 415-16.
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exigency existed that would warrant it, and we assume that an exigency exists
that would warrant the exercise of eminent domain. But the question at
bottom is upon whom the loss of the changes desired should fall. So far as
private persons or communities have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only
surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has become a danger
86
warrants the giving to them greater rights than they bought.
Holmes's point is clearly correct as a matter of private law. At most the
disgruntled landowners could have returned their land and recovered their costs.
They could not have gotten the support rights for free, more than 40 years after
failing to bargain for them as part of the initial transaction. But the reference to
assumption of risk ignores the special assessment operation which might ease
its effect.
By making clear that consent may obviate later invocation of the police
power, the passage also points to a second disagreement between Holmes and
Brandeis, who takes the position that the police power may in some instances
override consensual transactions.8 7 Brandeis's view marks an enormous alteration in the law's approach to contract, for it holds that regulation trumps
contract, rather than the other way around.
Brandeis had some imperfect support for his position in prior cases interpreting the Contract Clause. In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Nebraska,88 a case that illustrates the overall pattern of the Court's Contract
Clause jurisprudence prior to Mahon, the railroad constructed a viaduct pursuant to a contract with the city of Omaha that placed certain duties of maintenance and repair on the city. A subsequent statute shifted these duties back to
the railroad, without compensation of any kind to offset the increased costs. The
railroad claimed that the new statute amounted to an impairment of its old
contract and lost. 89 The Court drew a sharp distinction between public and
private contracts, and held that the rights of revision were far greater with the
former than the latter.90 Holmes clearly would have been very troubled by this

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 416.
Id. at 420 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
170 U.S. 57 (1898).
Id. at 58, 77.
As the Court stated,

Usually, where a contract, not contrary to public policy, has been entered into between parties
competent to contract, it is not within the power of either party to withdraw from its terms
without the consent of the other; and the obligation of such a contract is constitutionally
protected from hostile legislation. Where, however, the respective parties are not private
persons, dealing with matters and things in which the public has no concern, but are persons
or corporations whose rights and powers were created for public purposes, by legislative acts,
and where the subject-matter of the contract is one which affects the safety and welfare of the
public, other principles apply. Contracts of the latter description are held to be within the
supervising power and control of the legislature when exercised to protect the public safety,
health and morals, and that clause of the Federal Constitution which protects contracts from
legislative action cannot in every case be successfully invoked. The presumption is that when
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decision, given the uneasiness he demonstrated in Mahon about public necessity
as a justification for state regulation in the takings context. 9 ' Whatever necessity
might arise for reassigning work, none arise for the payment of money by one
source or the other. But given that private contracts were always on a different
footing, Holmes could ignore these precedents without so much as a word.
Once again, I think that Treanor is wrong to write as though Holmes and
Brandeis occupy the same ecological niche on the deference question. Holmes
thinks that the Contract Clause has more bite than his rival.
CONCLUSION

This Cook's tour shows, I think, that Holmes's world view in Mahon does not
reflect a consistent philosophy. In part the case is a prisoner of its precedents; in
part it reflects the predilections of an author who continued to hold in the
progressive era views that he formulated over thirty years earlier on the
Massachusetts Supreme Court; in part it reflects the lack of a systematic
approach that recognizes that monopoly and aggression present compelling, but
different cases for state regulation. Having recognized these shortcomings, we
should try to learn both from Mahon's insights, and from its blunders. Yet we
should not labor under the illusion that it presents a clear conceptual road map
for the future.
As already noted, Holmes did not think that his decision bore any relationship
to the much vexed problem of "regulatory takings" with which his decision has
been associated. 92 It is difficult, and ultimately fruitless, to retrofit Mahon into
this souped-up conceptual framework. What the statute at issue in Mahon did
was give the surface owner a veto right over certain operations within the mine.
Whether we call this realignment of property rights a "physical taking" (because a pillar of coal cannot in practice be mined) or a "regulatory taking"
(because any particular bit of coal can be mined so long as support right is
respected) does not address the question of whether compensation should be
paid, or why. More generally, the coherence of takings law requires that we
jettison distinctions such as this one, that give small points of difference the
undue legal weight that they now receive. In all cases, the relevant inquiry asks
what property rights have been taken, what justifications have been offered,
what compensation has been offered for the taking, and whether the taking is for
such contracts are entered into it is with the knowledge that parties cannot, by making
agreements on subjects involving the rights of the public, withdraw such subjects from the
police power of the legislature.
Id. at 72.
91. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651 (1981)). The other new entrant under the Takings Clause is the very dubious
phrase "investment-backed expectations" (expectations that are often dashed), which was introduced
into the case law by Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Both phrases come from the pen of Justice Brennan.
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a public use (an issue not fully addressed in Mahon). These issues require a
normative approach that, for all its epigrammatic brilliance, Mahon does not
articulate. In the end, therefore, this high-stakes game of constitutional interpretation will have to be battled out as a matter of legal principle, not as a matter of
precedent and personality. For all his greatness, Holmes is no exception to this
general rule as his erratic jurisprudence lurches from side to side.

